Sunae Kim

Surprisingly little is known about how informational relevance guides children’s informing decisions. Although prior studies have demonstrated that children selectively inform and teach others these studies do not directly address whether children consider informational relevance specific to an outgroup member. We also know that children by age 5 and 6 show robust preferences for their ingroup members in various decisions but does information relevance modulate their ingroup preferences? In three experiments (N = 180), we investigated whether Iraqi Kurdish 6-year-old children expect others to inform an ingroup member or an outgroup member, depending on the informational relevance. In Experiment 1 children expected others to inform an ingroup member rather than an outgroup member irrespective of information type – extending prior work on ingroup preferences. In experiments 2 and 3, in which the relevance of the information to an outgroup member was highlighted, children’s expectation about informing an ingroup member was modulated by information type. Together, the findings suggest that children consider informational relevance to guide their expectations about others’ selective informing in the context of group membership, which could further explain how cultural knowledge is maintained and reinforced among members of the same cultural group.

Curiosity – the desire to seek information – is fundamental for learning and performance. Studies on curiosity have shown that people are intrinsically motivated to seek information even if it does not bring an immediate tangible benefit (i.e., non-instrumental information), but little is known as to whether people have the metacognitive capability to accurately monitor their motivation for seeking information. We examined whether people can accurately predict their own non-instrumental information-seeking behavior. Across six experiments (Experiments 1A–1E and 2, total N = 579), participants predicted that they would engage in information-seeking behavior less frequently than they actually did, suggesting that people tend to underestimate the motivational lure of curiosity. Overall, there was no consistent statistical evidence that this underestimation was altered by contextual factors (e.g., the cost to seek information). These results were consistent with the theoretical account that it is difficult for people to make sense of the internally rewarding value of information in advance.

Prior studies explored the early development of memory monitoring and control. However, little work has examined cross-cultural similarities and differences in metacognitive development in early childhood. In the present research, we investigated a total of 100 Japanese and German preschool-aged children’s memory monitoring and control in a visual perception task. After seeing picture items, some of which were repeated, children were presented with picture pairs, one of which had been presented earlier and the other was a novel item. They then were asked to identify the previously presented picture. Children were also asked to evaluate their confidence about their selection, and to sort the responses to be used for being awarded with a prize at the end of the test. Both groups similarly expressed more confidence in the accurately remembered items than in the inaccurately remembered items, and their sorting decision was based on their subjective confidence. Japanese children’s sorting more closely corresponded to memory accuracy than German children’s sorting, however. These findings were further confirmed by a hierarchical Bayesian estimation of metacognitive efficiency. The present findings therefore suggest that early memory monitoring and control have both culturally similar and diverse aspects. The findings are discussed in light of broader sociocultural influences on metacognition.

Metacognitive abilities are considered as a hallmark of advanced human cognition. Existing empirical studies have exclusively focused on populations from Western and industrialized societies. Little is known about young children’s metacognitive abilities in other societal and cultural contexts. Here we tested 4-year-old Yucatec Mayan (a rural native population from Mexico) by adopting a metacognitive task in which children’s explicit assessment of their own knowledge states about the hidden content of a container and their informing judgments (whether or not to inform an ignorant person about the hidden contents of a container) were assessed. Similar to previous studies, we found that Yucatec Mayan children overestimated their knowledge states in the explicit metacognitive task. However, in contrast with studies on Western children, we did not find the facilitating effect of the implicit informing task over the explicit task. These findings suggest that the early development of metacognition combines universal and culture-sensitive features.

The metarepresentational aspect of early pretend play (make-believe activities where children create or participate in creating a new situation different from a real one) has been theoretically debated. In the present longitudinal study of N = 83 children, we tested for predictive relations of shared attention at 12–18 months, implicit false belief (FB) at 18 months, and pretend production at 18 months, as well as comprehension at 24 months. We also tested for long-term predictive relations of pretense production and comprehension with theory of mind (ToM) at the age of 4–5 years. Only pretense production directed toward others (but not self) was specifically related to infancy measures of shared attention. Early pretense, either production or comprehension, was not related to implicit FB or later ToM measures. The findings are discussed in terms of different theoretical accounts of early pretense.

Recent metacognitive research using a partial knowledge task indicates that a firm understanding of ‘knowing about knowing’ develops surprisingly late, at around 6 years of age. To reveal the mechanisms subserving this development, the partial knowledge task was used in a longitudinal study with 67 children (33 girls) as an outcome measure at 5;9 (years;months). In addition, first- and second-order false belief was assessed at 4;2, 5;0, and 5;9. At 2;6, perspective taking and executive abilities were evaluated. Metacognition at 5;9 was correlated with earlier theory of mind and perspective taking – even when verbal intelligence and executive abilities were partialled out. This highlights the importance of perspective taking for the development of an understanding of one’s own mind.

Prior studies document cross cultural variation in the developmental onset of mindreading. In particular, Japanese children are reported to pass a standard false belief task later than children from Western countries. By contrast, we know little about cross-cultural variation in young children’s metacognitive abilities. Moreover, one prominent theoretical discussion in developmental psychology focuses on the relation between metacognition and mindreading. Here we investigated the relation between mindreading and metacognition (both implicit and explicit) by testing 4-year-old Japanese and German children. We found no difference in metacognition between the two cultural groups. By contrast, Japanese children showed lower performance than German children replicating cultural differences in mindreading. Finally, metacognition and mindreading were not related in either group. We discuss the findings in light of the existing theoretical accounts of the relation between metacognition and mindreading.

Infants register and react to informational uncertainty in the environment. They also form expectations about the probability of future events as well as update the expectation according to changes in the environment. A novel line of research has started to investigate infants’ and toddlers’ behavior under uncertainty. By combining these research areas, the present research investigated 12- and 24-month-old infants’ searching behaviors under varying degree of informational uncertainty. An object was hidden in one of three possible locations and probabilistic information about the hiding location was manipulated across trials. Infants’ time delay in search initiation for a hidden object linearly increased across the level of informational uncertainty. Infants’ successful searching also varied according to probabilistic information. The findings suggest that infants modulate their behaviors based on probabilistic information. We discuss the possibility that infants’ behavioral reaction to the environmental uncertainty constitutes the basis for the development of subjective uncertainty.

An ability to flexibly learn from others while at other times relying upon one’s own judgements is an important adaptive human capacity. The present research investigated how others’ epistemic states and prior experience of their own independent ability in a given task modulate young children’s selective learning. In particular, we asked whether 4-year-old children’s judgement concerning the location of a hidden object is modulated both by an informant’s knowledge states and by the absence/presence of a prior experience with a particular task. We found that the children were more likely to align their judgement according to the informant’s verbal report when the informant was knowledgeable than when she was ignorant – but only when they had explicitly experienced their own incapability to accurately guess an object’s location. The findings suggest that 4-year-old children are able to combine their own experience with others’ input to make their judgement.

Consensus has both social and epistemic value. Children conform to consensus judgments in ways that suggest they are sensitive to the social value of consensus. Here we report two experiments providing evidence that 4-year-old children also are sensitive to the epistemic value of consensus. When multiple informants gave the same judgment concerning the hidden contents of a container, based on the observation of one of their members, children’s own judgments tended to align with the consensus judgment over the judgment of a lone character, whose observation received no endorsements. This tendency was reduced, however, when children were shown that the group consensus lacked epistemic warrant. Together, the findings provide evidence that young children are sensitive to the epistemic basis of consensus reports.

Despite an increasing number of studies demonstrating that young children selectively learn from others, and a few studies of children’s selective teaching, the evidence almost exclusively comes from Western cultures, and cross-cultural comparison in this line of work is very rare. In the present research, we investigated Japanese and German children’s selective learning and teaching abilities. We found clear cultural differences. Japanese children were better at selectively teaching an ignorant person over a knowledgeable person than at selectively learning from knowledgeable others. By contrast, German children were better at choosing to learn from a knowledgeable rather than from an ignorant person than at selectively teaching ignorant others. The present findings suggest that the development of human learning and teaching, especially the tendency to take into account others’ knowledge status, is strongly affected by cultural background.

Prior work shows that children selectively learn from credible speakers. Yet little is known how they treat information from non-credible speakers. This research examined to what extent and under what conditions children may or may not learn from problematic sources. In three studies, we found that children displayed trust toward previously inaccurate speakers. Children were equally likely to extend labels from previously accurate and inaccurate speakers to novel objects. Moreover, they expected third parties to share labels provided by previously inaccurate speakers. Only when there was clear evidence that the speakers' information was wrong (as in the case when speakers' perceptual access to the information was blocked), did young children reject the label. Together, the findings provide evidence that young children do not completely ignore the labels supplied by non-credible speakers unless there is strong reason to do so.

Prior research suggests that young children selectively inform others depending on others’ knowledge states. Yet, little is known whether children selectively inform others depending on their own knowledge states. To explore this issue, we manipulated 3- to 4-year-old children’s knowledge about the content of a box and assessed the impact on their decisions to inform another person. Moreover, we assessed the presence of uncertainty gestures while they inform another person in light of the suggestions that children's gestures reflect early developing, perhaps transient, epistemic sensitivity. Finally, we compared children’s performance in the informing context to their explicit verbal judgment of their knowledge states to further confirm the existence of a performance gap between the two tasks. In their decisions to inform, children tend to accurately assess their ignorance, whereas they tend to overestimate their own knowledge states when asked to explicitly report them. Moreover, children display different levels of uncertainty gestures depending on the varying degrees of their informational access. These findings suggest that children’s implicit awareness of their own ignorance may be facilitated in a social, communicative context.

Children recognize that people who know more are better informants than those who know less. How does an individual’s prior knowledge affect children’s decisions about whom to inform? In 3 experiments, 3- to 6-year-old children were invited to share a novel piece of information with 1 of 2 potential recipients who differed in their recent history of knowledge. Children tended to inform the previously knowledgeable person rather than the previously ignorant person. This same effect was observed in a 4th experiment when the knowledgeable person stated that she already knew the information the participant had to share. In no case was the opposite pattern observed: Children never chose to inform the person who had known less. These results seem to conflict with equity considerations and may reflect a preference to affiliate with competent social partners.

An evolutionary framework on human teaching is not well equipped to explain the nature of human teaching unless it specifies the subserving cognitive and motivational mechanisms. Only a theory that speculates on the psychological processes provides testable predictions and stimulates further empirical research.

In our reply to the commentaries by Jacqui Woolley and Rebekah Richert, we discuss the following: (1) possible effects that religious educations have on individual differences and (2) how older children may construe mind-readers.

In the present study, we investigated a total of fifty-one 3.5-, 4.5-, and 5.5-year-old children’s expectations about another person’s helping behaviors. We asked children to complete a story in which one person failed to complete his goal (e.g., because an object was misplaced or put out of his reach) while the other person observed the event. We asked whether the children expected the other person to help the protagonist or whether they expected the protagonist to help himself. Children of 3.5 years expected the other person to provide help in the majority of trials. In contrast, the older children were equally likely to predict that the other person would help the protagonist or the protagonist would help himself.

Kim and Harris (2014, J. Cogn. Dev.) showed that children selectively learned from an informant who produced apparently magical outcomes as compared to another informant who produced only ordinary outcomes in the domain of everyday physics. In the present study, we tested children's ability to differentiate between and selectively learn from informants who displayed either an extraordinary or an ordinary ability in the domain of everyday psychology. Prior studies have shown that children come to appreciate what is ordinarily involved in knowing the private mental states of other people. Drawing on this research, we asked whether 3- to 4- and 5- to 6-year-old children preferentially learned from an informant who knew another person's mind via either an ordinary or an extraordinary form of communication. As compared to younger children, older children were more likely to learn from the extraordinary informant. Moreover, children's ability to differentiate between the two informants was a better predictor of their learning from the extraordinary informant than age. We discuss the findings in the light of prior work on selective learning, children's ideas about prayer and their understanding of impossibility.

The present research investigates how young children evaluate and reason about the disclosure of private information. Using story vignettes, children aged 4–5 and 7–8 years were asked to evaluate an individual who passed on information from a peer revealing that he or she had broken a rule (e.g., stolen a cookie; rule type) or lacked a skill (e.g., could not ride a bicycle; competence type). These negative valence stories were compared with positive valence stories in which the peer had followed a rule or possessed a skill. Younger children approved the sharing of positive, but not negative, information, irrespective of type (rule vs. competence). Older children disapproved the disclosure of someone's incompetence, whereas they approved the disclosure of a rule violation. Children justified their evaluations by reference to social rules in the rule-type vignettes and to an individual's feelings in the competence-type vignettes. The findings suggest that young children are concerned about the disclosure of negative information about other people, but with age they become increasingly concerned about protecting the social order even at the cost of individual privacy.

Children are able to distinguish between regular events that can occur in everyday reality and magical events that are ordinarily impossible. How do children respond to a person who brings about magical as compared with ordinary outcomes? In two studies, we tested children's acceptance of informants' claims when the informants had produced either magical or ordinary outcomes. In Study 1, children's skeptical or credulous stance toward magic predicted their endorsement of the claims made by the informants. Children who were more credulous were likely to accept information from the informant who had produced magical outcomes. In Study 2, a brief manipulation was only partially effective in changing children's initial stance toward magic. Their initial stance toward magic continued to predict their acceptance of information from the informant who had produced magical outcomes.

Three experiments with preschool- and young school-aged children (N = 75 and 53) explored the kinds of relations children detect in samples of instances (descriptive problem) and how they generalize those relations to new instances (inferential problem). Each experiment initially presented a perfect biconditional relation between two features (e.g., all and only frogs are blue). Additional examples undermined one of the component conditional relations (not all frogs are blue) but supported another (only frogs are blue). Preschool-aged children did not distinguish between supported and undermined relations. Older children did show the distinction, at least when the test instances were clearly drawn from the same population as the training instances. Results suggest that younger children’s difficulties may stem from the demands of using imperfect correlations for predictions. Older children seemed sensitive to the inferential problem of using samples to make predictions about populations.

Prior work shows that children can make inductive inferences about objects based on their labels rather than their appearance (Gelman, 2003). A separate line of research shows that children's trust in a speaker's label is selective. Children accept labels from a reliable speaker over an unreliable speaker (e.g., Koenig & Harris, 2005). In the current paper, we tested whether 3- and 5-year-old children attend to speaker reliability when they make inductive inferences about a non-obvious property of a novel artifact based on its label. Children were more likely to use a reliable speaker's label than an unreliable speaker's label when making inductive inferences. Thus, children not only prefer to learn from reliable speakers, they are also more likely to use information from reliable speakers as the basis for future inferences. The findings are discussed in light of the debate between a similarity-driven and a label-driven approach to inductive inferences.

Ownership is not a “natural” property of objects, but is determined by human intentions. Facts about who owns what may be altered by appropriate decisions. However, young children often deny the efficacy of transfer decisions, asserting that original owners retain rights to their property. In Experiment 1, 4–5-year-old and 7–8-year-old children and adults were asked to resolve disputes between initial owners and various types of receivers (finders, borrowers, buyers). Experiment 2 involved disputes both before and after transfers of ownership. At all ages participants privileged owners over non-owners and accepted the effectiveness of property transfers. Overall, children's intuitions about property rights were similar to those of adults. Observed differences may reflect older participants’ willingness to segregate property rights from other considerations in assessing the acceptability of actions.

Cross-sectional and longitudinal data from students as they advance through the middle school years (grades 6–8) reveal insights into the development of students' pattern generalization abilities. As expected, students show a preference for lower-level tasks such as reading the data, over more distant predictions and generation of abstractions. Performance data also indicate a verbal advantage that shows greater success when working with words than graphs, a replication of earlier findings comparing words to symbolic equations. Surprisingly, students show a marked advantage with patterns presented in a continuous format (line graphs and verbal rules) as compared to those presented as collections of discrete instances (point-wise graphs and lists of exemplars). Student pattern–generalization performance also was higher when words and graphs were combined. Analyses of student performance patterns and strategy use contribute to an emerging developmental model of representational fluency. The model contributes to research on the development of representational fluency and can inform instructional practices and curriculum design in the area of algebraic development. Results also underscore the impact that perceptual aspects of representations have on students' reasoning, as suggested by an Embodied Cognition view.